Speaker: Dr. Ning Chen, University of Washington
Inviter: Dr. Sun Xiaoming, Center for Advanced Computing Research, ICT
Time: 14:00pm—15:00pm, May 10th, 2012 (Thursday)
Place: Room 446, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Abstract:
Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with ‘small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" In this talk, I will review the state of art of this field, and present some of our new results.
Based on joint papers with Xiaohui Bei, Nick Gravin, and Pinyan Lu.

Bio:
Dr. Chen obtained his Ph.D. in Computer Science & Engineering from University of Washington, USA, 2008. He joined Nanyang Technological University, Division of Mathematical Sciences, Singapore, in 2008 as a Nanyang Assistant Professor. His research interests include Algorithmic Game Theory, Theoretical Computer Science, and Internet Economics.