Home Sitemap Contact 中文 CAS
  • HOME
  • About Us
  • Research
  • People
  • International Cooperation
  • News
  • Education & Training
  • Join Us
  • Publications
  • Papers
  • Resources
  • Life at ICT
  • Links
  • Location:Home>News>Upcoming Events
    Budget Feasible Mechanism Design
    Update time: 2012-05-09
    Text Size: A A A
    Speaker: Dr. Ning Chen, University of Washington
    Inviter: Dr. Sun Xiaoming, Center for Advanced Computing Research, ICT
    Time: 14:00pm—15:00pm, May 10th, 2012 (Thursday)
    Place: Room 446, Institute of Computing Technology, Chinese Academy of Sciences
    Budget feasible mechanism design studies procurement combinatorial auctions where the sellers have private costs to produce items, and the buyer (auctioneer) aims to maximize a social valuation function on subsets of items, under the budget constraint on the total payment. One of the most important questions is "which valuation domains admit truthful budget feasible mechanisms with ‘small' approximations (compared to the social optimum)?" In this talk, I will review the state of art of this field, and present some of our new results.
    Based on joint papers with Xiaohui Bei, Nick Gravin, and Pinyan Lu.

    Dr. Chen obtained his Ph.D. in Computer Science & Engineering from University of Washington, USA, 2008. He joined Nanyang Technological University, Division of Mathematical Sciences, Singapore, in 2008 as a Nanyang Assistant Professor. His research interests include Algorithmic Game Theory, Theoretical Computer Science, and Internet Economics.


    Address :No.6 Kexueyuan South Road Zhongguancun,Haidian District Beijing,China
    Postcode :100190 Tel : (8610)62601166 Email : office@ict.ac.cn